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Guide To Valuing Professional Partnership
Interests For Purposes Of Equitable
Distribution Of Marital Assets Pursuant To
Pennsylvania Law: Interpreting And
Applying Partnership Agreements
I. Introduction
In the proceedings surrounding the dissolution of a marriage,
equitable distribution of marital property is a process often plagued
with complications. Questions arise regarding the identification and
valuation of marital assets owned by both spouses. Difficulties
often present themselves when one spouse is a member of a
partnership. Such an equity interest is difficult to value for
purposes of equitable distribution. The inherent problem of
valuing a partnership interest lies with the fact that the professional
spouse1 usually intends to remain in the partnership despite
divorce. Thus, the value of the partnership interest attributable to
the professional spouse cannot be ascertained by liquidation. Nor
is there an active market for the purchase and sale of a professional
partnership interest that can serve as a guide. Furthermore, the
partnership interest may have a higher value to the partner who
intends to retain it than to a third party buyer. Finally, the
partnership interest may have limitations on its value imposed by
the partnership agreement.
Accordingly, courts have adopted a variety of approaches to
valuing a partnership interest.2 The approaches have two common
1. This Comment will refer to the member of the partnership or business entity as the
.professional spouse" or "partner". The spouse who is not a member of the organization
at issue will be designated as the "nonprofessional spouse."
2. See generally, Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Accountability for Good Will of
Professional Practice in Actions Arising from Divorce or Separation, 52 A.L.R.3d 1344 (1987);
Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Valuation of Goodwill in Accounting Practice for Purposes
of Divorce Court's Property Distribution, 77 A.L.R. 4th 609 (1991); Martin J. McMahon,
Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Goodwill in Law Practice as Property Subject to
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threads: (1) a careful attention to the facts of each particular case,
and (2) the goal of fairness to the parties via accuracy in valuation.
This Comment will examine the valuation of professional
partnership interests in Pennsylvania, with an emphasis on the
applicability of partnership agreements as a tool for valuation.
Attention will also be given to the identification of distributable
economic goodwill of a professional partnership. Part II sets forth
general considerations for equitable distribution, including the
policy behind the Domestic Relations Code which includes the
statutory divorce guidelines of Pennsylvania. Part III briefly
outlines the basis for recognizing a partnership interest as marital
property subject to equitable distribution. Part IV discusses the
basic means of valuing a partnership interest such as fair market
value or holder's interest value. Part V addresses the identification
of the goodwill of a partnership as a marital asset. Part VI
examines the applicability of the partnership agreement as a tool
for valuation of a partnership interest. Finally, Part VII synthesizes
the courts' two primary approaches to valuation into a fact-specific
guide to the applicability of partnership agreements for valuation
purposes.
II. General Considerations Regarding Equitable Distribution
When enacting the Domestic Relations Code the policy of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was to "[e]ffectuate economic
justice between-the parties who are divorced.., and insure a fair
and just determination and settlement of their property rights."3
A court must equitably divide marital property upon the request of
either party in an action for divorce or annulment.4 A court must
not presume a fifty-fifty division when distributing marital property,
because equitable distribution need not be equal, only equitable.5
Distribution on Dissolution of Marriage, 79 A.L.R.4th 171 (1992); Eve Barrie Masinter,
Professional Goodwill in Louisiana: An Analysis of its Classification, Valuation, and Partition,
43 LA. L. REV. 119 (1982).
3. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3102(a)(6) (1991).
4. Id. § 3502(a).
5. Fratangelo v. Fratangelo, 520 A.2d 1195, 1200-01 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). The court
discusses at great length that the starting point of any equitable distribution analysis is the
list of factors enumerated by the Divorce Code, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 401(d) (1990)
(revised as 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 3323). Fratangelo, 520 A.2d at 1200-01. Moreover, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has declared community property laws unconstitutional, and,
therefore, "[t]o the extent that there is an automatic bestowal of the separate property of one
spouse on the other, as is the law in community property states, it is unconstitutional as a
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Thus, a court must consider each situation individually with
reference to the factors set forth in the Domestic Relations Code6
in order to distribute the property in a fashion that will promote
fair results.7  Consequently, a trial court commits no abuse of
discretion merely because the parties do not receive equal shares
of the marital assets.
8
The actions of a court in equitably dividing marital property
can be divided into three essential steps. The threshold step is the
determination of what assets constitute marital property subject to
distribution.9 The second step involves the accurate valuation of
that property." Finally, the marital assets must be allocated
between the parties while taking into account the factors enu-
deprivation of property in violation of due process." Id. at 1200 (citing Everson v. Everson,
431 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1981)).
6. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502(a). The section provides:
In an action for divorce or annulment, the court shall, upon the request of either
party, equitably divide, distribute or assign in kind or otherwise, the marital
property between the parties without regard to marital mis-conduct in such
proportions and in such manner as the court deems just after considering all
relevant factors, including:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) Any prior marriage of either party.
(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,
employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties.
(4) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning
power of the other party.
(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets and
income.
(6) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not limited to medical,
retirement, insurance or other benefits.
(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation,
depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the contribution of
a party as a homemaker.
(8) The value of the property set apart to each party.
(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.
(10) The economic circumstances of each party, including Federal, State and local
tax ramifications, at the time the division of property is to become effective.
(11) Whether the party will be serving as the custodian of any dependent minor
children.
Id
7. Frantangelo, 520 A.2d at 1203.
8. Williamson v. Williamson, 586 A.2d 967, 970 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). See also Brown
v. Brown, 507 A.2d 1223, 1226 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that it is within a court's
discretion to determine whether a property right was acquired during marriage and whether
equity dictates that it be included as part of the marital estate).
9. Schneeman v. Schneeman, 615 A.2d 1369, 1371-73 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
10. Id
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merated in the Domestic Relations Code as well as the ultimate
goal of fairness in the distribution."
III. Recognition Of A Professional Partnership Interest As
Marital Property Subject To Equitable Distribution
Pennsylvania Courts first recognized marital property in a
partnership interest by implication in Semasek v. Semasek.1
2
When addressing one spouse's depletion of funds in a banking
account, the Semasek court held that the "intentional dissipation of
marital assets by one party does not preclude the asset's status as
marital property in equitable distribution."13  Extending this
principle, the court found that one spouse's intentional interference
with the other's law practice likewise constituted the dissipation of
marital assets.14 Thus, the court implied that the growth of a
partnership interest is a marital asset subject to equitable distr-
ibution.15
The Pennsylvania Superior Court applied its holding in
Semasek to find the existence of marital property in such partner-
ship interests as law firms,16 medical practices,17 architectural
enterprises,18 equine clinics and horse breeding businesses, 9 and
dental firms.2' Other jurisdictions have also recognized that
partnership interests are marital property.21  The superior court
noted, however, that although the general principle that an interest
11. Id. at 1374.
12. 479 A.2d 1047 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
13. Id. at 1051. Accordingly, the court included the $75,000 appropriated by one of the
spouses from joint bank accounts in its calculations for equitable distribution. Id.
14. Id. at 1052 n.3. The court noted that the income of the professional spouse's private
practice had declined over $16,000 as a result of the nonprofessional spouse's behavior.
Thus, the decline in salary was lost value of marital property within the purview of 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 401(d)(7) (revised as 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 3323). Semasek, 479 A.2d at 1052
n.3.
15. Id. at 1051.
16. Beasley v. Beasley, 518 A.2d 545 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
17. DeMasi v. DeMasi, 530 A.2d 871 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
18. Buckl v. Buckl, 542 A.2d 65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
19. Solomon v. Solomon, 611 A.2d 686 (Pa. 1992).
20. Fexa v. Fexa, 578 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
21. See, e.g., Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1983) (holding that a husband's interest
in a law practice, which he conducted through the means of a professional corporation in
which he was the sole owner, was marital property); E.E.C. v. E.J.C., 457 A.2d 688 (Del.
1983) (concluding that lawyer's interest in his practice, which he conducted as a sole
proprietor, was marital property subject to equitable distribution).
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in a partnership is easily determined,22 the absolute valuation of
such an interest for purposes of equitable distribution is a difficult,
if not impossible task.' Numerous states have recognized the
problems inherent in the valuation of partnership interests.24 For
example, the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated: "[p]lacing a
precise or even an approximately accurate value upon an interest
in a professional partnership, when the partner whose interest is in
question intends to continue as a member of the firm, is no easy
matter."'
IV. Basic Valuation Methods For Partnership Interests
A court valuing a professional practice interest will seek to
find a value that accurately reflects the worth of the asset. In most
instances, the method used by any court will be fact specific rather
than a predetermined formula.26 Of primary importance to a
court's analysis is the viewpoint from which it begins its calcula-
tions. For instance, if the value of the interest is to be based on
what another party would pay in an arms-length transaction, then
fair market value can be established. Alternatively, the "going
concern" or "holder's value" will be ascertained if the court seeks
to find the value of the interest to the partner continuing in the
enterprise.
Fair market value is a widely recognized standard of value.
For estate and gift tax purposes, fair market value has been defined
as the price for which "property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compul-
sion to buy or sell, and both having a reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts."27 As a sales-based measure of value, fair market
22. Buckl, 542 A.2d at 67.
23. Id. The Pennsylvania Superior Court reiterated its concern with the difficulty of
valuing partnership interests in McCabe v. McCabe, 543 A.2d 558, 559 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
when it said that "[j]udicial experience leads us to state that the difficulty in valuing marital
property becomes more acute when the subject of the valuation becomes less tangible."
24. See, e.g., Mori v. Mori, 603 P.2d 85 (Ariz. 1979) (ruling that accounts receivable by
professional law corporations were marital assets includable in distribution of property). But
see, McClennon v. McClennon, 464 P.2d 982 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that a trial court
did not err in dividing community property in divorce proceedings when it evaluated
husband's interest in law partnership even though the valuation did not account for the
husband's share of accounts receivable).
25. Stern v. Stem, 331 A.2d 257, 260 (N.J. 1975).
26. Butler v. Butler, 663 A.2d 148, 154 (Pa. 1995).
27. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (1958). Another definition of fair market value is the price
that goods or property would bring in a market of willing buyers and sellers in the ordinary
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
value often conflicts with the possibility that the professional
spouse will continue in a partnership after the divorce.' Never-
theless, fair market value provides a basis for valuing many of the
components of a business entity that wholly comprise the value of
the enterprise.
When valuing a partnership interest as a going concern,
however, the focus of the analysis is on the value of the interest to
the partner who plans to remain in the business.29 Basically, if the
interest in the business is worth considerably more to the owner
than to another party, assuming the owner plans to continue to
operate the business and reap financial rewards, then the value
accorded to the business should be the higher value. This is
determined by the owner's preference to continue in the enter-
prise," and has been labeled the "holder's interest value."
In most instances, a court will value a business by combining
the value of the separate components of the enterprise.31 Such an
approach provides for easier valuation because individual assets,
such as fixtures or accounts receivable, are part of an active market
by which a value can be established. Thus, a court must look to a
multitude of factors when valuing a partnership interest.32
Generally, the valuation of a partnership interest upon dissolution
of a marriage involves the calculation of the professional spouse's
share of the following combination of business assets:
capital investment, capital accounts, accrued equity, and
accounts receivable ... any other fixed share of partnership
course of trade. Naturally, such value cannot be determined on the basis of a price that
would be acceptable to a buyer or seller operating under pressures or constraints. BLACK'S
LAW DICIONARY 597-98 (6th ed. 1990).
28. Joseph W. Cunningham, Equitable Distribution and Professional Practices: Case
Specific Approach to Valuation, 3 MIcH. Bus. L.J. 666, July 1994.
29. Id. at 667.
30. Id. at 667-68. Cunningham notes, however, that the "holder's interest value"
approach is not radically different from the case specific methods of valuation that have
evolved and become generally accepted. This is due to the fact that the use of the holder's
interest measure brings into conformity the valuation of personal service businesses with the
way most other marital assets have been valued over the years. Id. A practice will likely
possess value to the owner over and above that available on the fair market, and accordingly,
the non-owner spouse should share in the higher value for purposes of equitable distribution.
Id.
31. Buckl v. Buckl, 542 A.2d 65, 67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (relying on Dag E. Ytreberg,
Annotation, Evaluation of Interest in Law Firm or Medical Partnership for Purposes of
Division of Property in Divorce Proceedings, 74 A.L.R.3d 621 (1976)).
32. Id.
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worth carried on the partnership books, the value of work in
progress, any appreciation of the true worth of tangible
personalty over and above book value, goodwill, if any,.., and
partnership life insurance. 3
A court will attempt to establish the total value of any
property possessed by the enterprise. The partner's share of the
above assets will provide a value for the partnership interest. Most
of the assets listed above can be valued by ascertaining fair market
value. Some portions of a business, however, are not as easily
valued. Specifically, the intrinsic value of the business to the owner
is often difficult to ascertain. Likewise, valuing the goodwill of a
corporation is difficult when the business is not for sale.34
Despite the difficulties in valuation, a court acting in equity has
great discretion in examining the facts of a case and calculating
what it deems to be a fair value.35 Accordingly, the partnership
agreement can be of great value in guiding a court by establishing
what assets a partner owns as well as the priorities of the enterprise
as a whole.36
V. Goodwill As An Asset Subject To Equitable Distribution
While most assets of a business entity can be both easily
identified and valued, the valuation of goodwill is more difficult
and therefore problematic. 37 Goodwill has been narrowly defined
as that element of the value of a business which arises in the fixed
and favorable consideration of customers as their regard for an
established, well-known, and properly operated business. 8  In
other words, goodwill is the probability that prior customers will
return to the business. 39 Goodwill is therefore distinguishable
from the "going value" or "profits" of an enterprise.' When
broadly defined, goodwill encompasses the advantage acquired by
33. Ytreberg, supra note 31, at 624-25. The formula has been adopted by numerous
courts. See, e.g., Stem v. Stem, 331 A.2d 257, 261 (N.J. 1975); Buckl, 542 A.2d at 70; In re
Marriage of Morris, 588 S.W.2d 39, 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
34. See part V, infra.
35. Williamson v. Williamson, 586 A.2d 967, 970 (Pa. Super. CL 1991).
36. Buckl, 542 A.2d at 70.
37. Id. at 68 (stating that "[t]he concept of goodwill is nebulous at best and consequently
the placing of a dollar valuation is most difficult").
38. Beasley v. Beasley, 518 A.2d 545, 550 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (relying on 38 C.J.S.
Goodwill § 1 (1943)).
39. Id. at 550 (citing 38 AM. JUR. 2D Goodwill § 1).
40. Id. (relying on 38 C.J.S. Goodwill § 1 (1943)).
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an establishment, beyond the value of property or funds, resulting
from any factors contributing to the reputation of the business and
public patronage.4' This advantage may be composed of any of
the following factors: common celebrity, reputation for skill or
affluence, punctuality, and other accidental circumstances or
necessities, or even simply partialities or prejudices.4 2 Under any
definition, goodwill is inseparable from the business in which it
inheres because it has no independent existence; it is a product of
the continuing efforts of the business.43
Although the concept of goodwill is often difficult to define
and value, Pennsylvania courts have established distinctions based
upon the nature of the business and the efforts of the individual
whose partnership interest is subject to equitable distribution.'
In Beasley v. Beasley,45 the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed
the issue of the goodwill of a sole proprietorship. 6 The court's
analysis involved a comparison of the nature of goodwill possessed
by a sole proprietor versus that held by a professional corpora-
tion.47 In the former, goodwill cannot be transferred upon
dissolution of the enterprise, while in the latter, goodwill has value
which can be exchanged.48 Simply stated, a sole proprietorship
has goodwill, but that goodwill is attached to the owner rather than
the enterprise itself.49 The professional corporation, on the other
hand, holds goodwill in the context of the association, or some
share of it, as an entity separate and apart from the members that
comprise it.5" The court bolstered its opinion with the additional
argument that the goodwill of a sole proprietorship can be related
41. Id. at 550 (quoting 38 AM. JUR. 2D Goodwill § 1 (1968)).
42. Id.
43. Beasley, 518 A.2d at 550 (relying on 38 C.J.S. Goodwill § 3 (1943)).
44. Fexa v. Fexa, 578 A.2d 1314, 1317 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). The court reiterated that
the determination of whether alienable or realizable goodwill exists in a particular enterprise
may "often be a difficult and subtle question of fact." Id. Additionally, the court questioned
the ethics of selling professional clients, as encompassed by goodwill, because of the likely
presence of client confidences, especially with regard to doctors and attorneys. Id.
45. 518 A.2d 545 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
46. Id. The professional spouse, an attorney, operated the practice in the form of a sole
proprietorship while employing approximately fifteen other attorneys. Id.
47. Id. at 552.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Beasley, 515 A.2d at 552. See also Geesbright v. Geesbright, 570 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1978).
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only to the future earnings of the owner,51 and future income is
not within the realm of marital property subject to equitable
distribution.52 Based on the facts of the case, the superior court
found that although the sole proprietorship had goodwill, it could
not be included in the value of the enterprise for purposes of
equitable distribution. 3
The superior court refused to allow goodwill to be added to
the value of a business in situations, other than sole proprietor-
ships, when the goodwill attaches itself only to an individual.'
For example, the case of DeMasi v. DeMasi55 involved a doctor
who was a joint member of a partnership with another physician. 6
The professional spouse was a rheumatologist, who received
patients from the community through a referral network composed
of other physicians.57  The patients patronized the business with
the specific purpose of seeking the rheumatologist's expertise."
Thus, the doctor's partner would be incapable of retaining the
patients if the rheumatologist left the firm.59 Accordingly, the
court found that although the business was a partnership and could
continue without the professional spouse, the goodwill inherent in
51. Beasley, 515 A.2d at 553.
52. Id. See also Hodge v. Hodge, 520 A.2d 15 (Pa. 1986). The primary issue in Hodge
was whether an advanced degree, such as a medical license, qualified as marital property.
Id. at 16. In deciding that an advanced degree was not property for purposes of equitable
distribution, the court analyzed earning capacity under Pennsylvania statutes. Id at 17. In
its analysis, the court reasoned that future income would be earned at a time after the
dissolution of the marriage. Id. As a result, the future income cannot be marital property
because any property classified as such must by definition be acquired during the marriage.
Id.
53. Beasley, 518 A.2d at 554. But see Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1981).
54. DeMasi v. DeMasi, 530 A.2d 871 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). See also Levy v. Levy, 397
A.2d 374 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (holding that goodwill generated by an attorney
who operated a professional association was marital property subject to valuation);
Nehorayhoff v. Nehorayhoff, 437 N.Y.S.2d 584 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981) (stating that the goodwill
of a medical partnership is distributable where patients are derived from advertisement,
reputation or referral, and where the physician's skills were not unique in the area). But see
Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1983) (implying that goodwill in a sole proprietorship may
be marital property in finding that attorney's goodwill in an exclusively owned corporation
was marital property).
55. 530 A.2d 871 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
56. Id. at 883.
57. Id.
58. Id. The court found that eighty-five percent of the doctor's patients were treated
for rheumatism. Id. Further, seventy percent of the patients developed from the referrals
of other physicians. Id.
59. Id. at 883.
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the business was similar to the type of goodwill possessed by a sole
proprietorship. 6° Specifically, the goodwill existed because of the
doctor's personal reputation, and without his efforts, the firm would
be unable to retain his clientele.61
In summary, the nature of the business will provide the most
guidance and will aid in assessing the goodwill of an enterprise for
purposes of equitable distribution.62 Specifically, the reputation
established by the corporate entity as enhanced by the professional
spouse must be analyzed. If the nature of the goodwill is purely
personal to the individual and results only from the efforts of that
person, then the goodwill is not likely to be an asset subject to
equitable distribution. Such goodwill can be characterized by its
inability to be transferred by or alienated from the professional
because it would not survive disassociation of the professional
spouse from the business entity.
Conversely, as the efforts of the individual become less
substantial in enhancing the reputation of the business, the goodwill
enjoyed by the enterprise becomes more a product and asset of the
business itself. The value of such goodwill can be realized by the
sale of the partnership, in whole or in part, to another. The
goodwill, then, can be separated from the professional spouse, and
it will last beyond the employment of the individual by the firm.
Therefore, goodwill can be included in the value of the enterprise
when the business is valued as a marital asset for equitable
distribution.
VI. The Use Of The Partnership Agreement As A Guide To
Valuation
Business enterprises are often founded with a partnership
agreement that outlines the substantive rights of the partners
regarding equity ownership in the organization.63 Generally, the
partnership agreement will indicate the considerations of the
business that are most important to the enterprise.' The use of
a partnership agreement, however, often presents difficulty because
such agreements usually address valuation in the context of
60. Demasi, 530 A.2d at 883-84.
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
63. McCabe v. McCabe, 575 A.2d 87, 89 (Pa. 1990).
64. Id.
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voluntary withdrawal, death of a partner, or dissolution of the
firm.' Partnership agreements rarely address the valuation of a
partner's interest vis a vis equitable distribution following the
termination of a marital relationship.' Nevertheless, courts have
found partnership agreements67 and the Uniform Partnership
Act' to be important factors for purposes of valuation because
they indicate the value that can, in some instances, be removed
from an enterprise by a partner.69
A. Pennsylvania Decisions
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has had two recent occasions
to examine partnership agreements as valuation aids for equitable
distribution. In McCabe v. McCabe,7' the court found the terms
of the agreement to be controlling, whereas in Butler v. Butler,71
the partnership agreement was disregarded after detailed consider-
ation. This apparent contradiction turns on the accuracy of the
agreement in valuing the current worth of the business enterprise.
An examination of the facts of each case provides clues as to the
court's view of what constitutes a partnership agreement valid for
use in the context of equitable distribution.
In McCabe, the Pennsylvania Superior Court and the Court of
Common Pleas disagreed as to the application of the partnership
65. Buckl v. Buckl, 542 A.2d 65, 70 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
66. Id.
67. Stern v. Stem, 331 A.2d 257, 260 (N.J. 1975) (explaining that if a partnership
agreement exists, valuation of the partner's interest can be attempted by reviewing the
agreement). See also Weaver v. Weaver, 324 S.E.2d 915, 917 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985);
Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343 (Wis. 1981); In re Marriage of Fonstein, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 264, 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (using partnership agreements as the starting point for
valuation).
68. 59 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 331 (1975) (repealed 1989). The section, which set forth
the rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership agreement, provided:
The rights and duties of partners in relation to the partnership shall be deter-
mined, subject to any agreement between them, by the following rules:
(1) Each partner shall be repaid his contributions, whether by way of capital
or advances to the partnership property, and share equally in the profits and
surplus remaining after all liabilities, including those to partners, are satisfied; and
must contribute towards the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by
the partnership, according to his share in the profits.
Id
69. Buckl, 542 A.2d at 70.
70. 575 A.2d 87, 90 (Pa. 1990).
71. 663 A.2d 148, 152-53 (Pa. 1995).
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agreement for valuation purposes.7 2  The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court found that the court of common pleas had overestimated the
value of the enterprise by viewing it as a going concern.73 Endor-
sing the view espoused by the superior court, the supreme court
found the value which utilized the explicit terms of the partnership
agreement to be accurate.74 The supreme court qualified its
decision by noting several factors specific to the particular partner-
ship agreement.
75
The court believed that the business entity to be valued was
different from many other types of enterprises, including other
firms with partnership agreements. 76 First, the firm did not have
a market through which shares in the organization could be bought
or sold. 7 Second, a partner could not sell his share to another
individual.78 Such an opportunity could aid in valuation by
revealing a fair market value for the firm or a portion thereof
79
Third, a partner could not dictate individually that the firm be sold
or liquidated." Finally, a partner did not have the right to retire
from the firm and continue to receive a share of the enterprise's
profits.81 The court believed these factors to indicate that a
valuation of the firm as a going concern was inaccurate for
purposes of equitable distribution.'
72. McCabe v. McCabe, 543 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), affd 575 A.2d 87 (Pa.
1990).
73. McCabe, 575 A.2d at 89. The court of common pleas disregarded the partnership
agreement entirely when valuing the partnership interest at approximately $286,000. IS at
88. Included in the "going concern" value were all of the firms assets, such as equipment,
books, cash, etc., accounts receivable, minus accounts payable and an allowance for bad debt,
and work in progress meaning services rendered but not yet billed, IiS The appraisal did
not indicate any attempt at the valuation of goodwill. Id.
74. 1I at 88. The formula, as provided by the partnership agreement and utilized by
the superior court in valuing the partnership interest at $18,900, allowed a partner to receive
a share of the capital account, minus any indebtedness to the firm, and, if ninety days notice
was given, the partner's share of undistributed profits to date. Id. The formula was
applicable for valuing a partner's interest in the firm regardless of the reason for leaving.
Id.
75. Id. at 89-90.
76. Id. at 89.
77. Id.




82. Id. at 89. The supreme court believed that valuation of the partnership interest as
a going concern would be correct only when the partner could "sell, liquidate, or otherwise
realize the going concern value." Id.. The court believed that the facts had clearly
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The court believed that the substantive rights of the partners
as enumerated by the agreement could not be disregarded since the
agreement strictly limited the value of the partner's interest that
could in any event be realized.83 Such value consisted of a share
of the capital account, minus any indebtedness to the firm, and, if
proper notice was provided, a share of undistributed profits to
date.'4 The partnership agreement was designed to constrict the
ownership interest of any partner in the firm, in an effort to place
the "continuing welfare of the partnership as a whole above the
interests of any particular member of the firm."8 5  The court
thought that such limitations could not be ignored in valuing the
partner's interest for equitable distribution. 6 Additionally, the
court noted that by the partner's association with the firm in the
past, both parties had already benefitted from the continuing
welfare of the firm.'
A factually distinct situation in Butler caused the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to disregard the partnership agreement as the
primary means of ascertaining the value of the professional
spouse's interest in the partnership.88 The professional spouse in
Butler attempted to rely upon McCabe's strict adherence to the
partnership agreement.89 In disregarding the agreement, the
supreme court emphasized several factors.
First, the agreement in Butler provided for two substantially
different values depending on whether the partner died or
voluntarily withdrew from the enterprise.' If the former oc-
curred, the partner's beneficiary would receive the proceeds of a
life insurance policy in the amount of $100,000.91 In the latter
instance, the partner would get only $2,450, a sum calculated from
the partner's shares of stock in the firm multiplied by a set value
of $10 per share.92 Thus, for purposes of equitable distribution
established that the going concern value could not be realized in any event. Id.
83. McCabe, 575 A.2d at 89 ("[T]he agreement must be viewed as the preeminent factor
in valuing a partner's fights.").
84. Id.
85. lit at 89.
86. Id.
87. Id. at n.4.
88. Butler, 663 A.2d at 153.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 150.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 150.
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the partnership agreement did not provide a clear value of the
interest in the firm held by the partner.93 In contrast, the McCabe
agreement allowed only one payment for a partner's interest
regardless of the reason for departure from the firm." Second,
the professional spouse in McCabe was one of many partners in the
firm,95 while the individual in Butler was one of two partners at
the time of separation.96 Third, the value of the partnership in
Butler, as based on the stock held by the members of the firm, had
not changed in the nearly twenty years of the firm's operation.
97
Since the value of the firm was essentially predetermined, such a
value did not reflect the company's current financial status.98
Conversely, the partnership in McCabe was valued with a formula
that considered the present day assets and liabilities of the firm. 99
The valuation in McCabe based on the partnership agreement
incorporated the growth of the business entity during the time of
the marriage and thus allowed for a more accurate assessment of
the partnership interest as marital property.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decisions in McCabe and
Butler were based on different situations and partnership agree-
ments. The court appeared to be guided by different goals in each
case. In McCabe, the court found it determinative that the
agreement limited the amount that the partner could realize for his
interest in the partnership."°  The court thought that injustice
would result from any value greater than the dollar amount which
93. Butler, 663 A.2d at 150. Additionally, the shareholder agreement provided for
termination of the partnership upon either bankruptcy, receivership or dissolution of the
Company; the death of all stockholders within a ninety-day time period; or where only one
shareholder remains under the agreement. Id.
94. McCabe, 575 A.2d at 88.
95. Id. at 89 n.3.
96. Butler, 663 A.2d at 150 n.2.
97. Id. at 153.
98. Id.
99. McCabe, 575 A.2d at 88.
100. Id. at 89. While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court paid little attention to the
partner's situation arising from valuation of the partnership interest as a going concern, the
Superior Court felt that such a resulting situation would be inequitable. McCabe v. McCabe,
543 A.2d 558, 561, (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), affd 575 A.2d 87 (Pa. 1990). The court noted that
termination of the professional spouse's partnership interest would leave the partner, at the
age of 62, with only the partnership interest and $26,000 worth of cash and property. Id
In equitable distribution proceedings, however, the nonprofessional spouse would receive
$301,000 worth of cash and personalty. Id. The court stated, "[T]his hardly appears
equitable . I..." Id
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the partner could withdraw from the enterprise.' In Butler, the
court placed emphasis on the actual value of the partnership
interest rather than on any realizable gain which could result when
the partner disassociated from the firm.t In each decision, the
court believed its valuation to be the fairest possible and thus,
appropriate in advancing the goal of fairness in equitable distri-
bution.
Despite the difference between the two cases, both McCabe
and Butler offer valuable guidance for using a partnership agree-
ment as a valuation tool."°3 Initially, no single formula exists for
valuing a partnership interest because such matters are fact specific.
The partnership agreement remains the starting point for valuation,
even if it is not determinative. The agreement should be examined
to determine if it provides a clear value of the partner's interest.
A value that is constant despite the reasons for the professional
spouse's departure or a value designated specifically for purposes
of equitable distribution will likely be helpful. Any method of
valuation must have a basis in the current worth of the enterprise.
Such a method will encompass the various assets of the firm at
moments relevant to the divorce. Thus, a fixed value will likely be
of no assistance. Furthermore, the valuation formula can provide
clues as to the importance of the partnership as a collective of the
individual members. Formulas that restrict the ability of a partner
to remove portions of the assets will show that the continuing
welfare of the enterprise is paramount. Accordingly, all character-
istics of the business entity and the partnership agreement must be
weighed in order to arrive at an accurate value which both fulfills
the goals of the Domestic Relations Code1" and effects a fair
settlement of marital assets.
101. McCabe, 575 A.2d at 89. (The court stated that "[I]t would be unrealistic therefore
to assign this [unrealizable] value to the partnership interest for purposes of equitable
distribution.").
102. Butler, 663 A.2d at 153. The Pa. Supreme Court knew that under the terms of the
partnership agreement, the partner would never be able to realize the value placed on the
interest as a going concern. Id. Nevertheless, the court did not believe that the shareholder
agreement should necessarily control valuation of the partnership interest. Id.
103. See supra notes 70-102 and accompanying text.
104. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3102-3707.
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B. Response of Other Jurisdictions to Equitable Distribution
Situations Not Yet Examined by Pennsylvania Courts
While Pennsylvania courts have addressed the valuation of a
partnership interest in various situations, the practices of other
jurisdictions may serve as a guide to clarifying the process of
valuation. All states seek to value a partner's interest in a business
enterprise fairly, and the variations in a court's approach often can
be accounted for by the circumstances of the action.
In many instances the usefulness of the partnership agreement
lies somewhere between the Pennsylvania decisions in McCabe and
Butler. Since most agreements anticipate only the voluntary
withdrawal, death, or retirement of a partner, particular difficulty
can arise when the values for each contingency are closer to one
another than were the values in the Butler decision, but are still
substantially different from that case. In situations of this nature,
a court may review evidence that supports the greater likelihood of
one contingency occurring as compared to another. For example,
in Balogh v. Balogh,1 5 the Court of Appeals of Minnesota
reversed a trial judge who relied on one of three options in a
partnership agreement for valuation without showing evidence to
support his decision." The professional spouse was not ques-
tioned regarding his future plans, but an expert did provide
statistical evidence of the probable occurrence of each contingency
addressed by the agreement.1°7 Nevertheless, the trial judge was
105. 356 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
106. Id. at 312. The partnership agreement provided three formulas depending upon the
contingency which was addressed. Id. at 311. The purchase price in the event of death,
normal retirement or full disability included the following: two and one half times the annual
draw as defined by the three highest years in the preceding tens years of partnership, payable
in sixty equal monthly installments without interest, and a pro-rata share of profit or loss for
the year in which the partner left the organization. Id. In case of termination of interest and
retirement from private practice in the State of Minnesota prior to normal retirement age,
the price included: the greater of the prior year's draw or the partner's capital account at the
close of the previous year, payable in twenty-four equal monthly installments, and a pro-rata
share of the profit or loss for the year of termination. Id. In the case of termination of
interest and continuation in private practice in the State of Minnesota, the purchase price
was to be based on the following: the lesser of the partner's capital account at the close of
the prior year or the previous year's draw, to be paid in twenty-four equal monthly
installments. Id. The trial judge valued the partnership interest at approximately $128,000
pursuant to the formula for death, normal retirement or full disability. Id.
107. Id. at 312. The expert determined that the likelihood of normal retirement, death
or disability was twenty-five percent, the probability of early retirement was five percent, and
the chance of termination to practice elsewhere was seventy percent. Id. While the trial
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found in error for failing to support his conclusions, and the case
was remanded to determine the chance of each contingency
occurring in order to ascertain the proper valuation formula, or to
allow an award based on the professional spouse's payout "if and
when such benefits are paid."'"° A later Minnesota case, Flynn
v. Flynn,'°9 underscored the importance of evidence in the selec-
tion of a specific option for purposes of valuing a spouse's interest
in a partnership. The court reiterated that "[a] valuation reason-
ably supported by... testimony will be affirmed."' 10
Therefore, the use of a particular contingency formula set forth
by a partnership agreement will be upheld if sufficient reasons exist
to support the choice. An appropriate goal for choosing a
particular option has been its consistency in the accuracy of
valuation. A voluntary withdrawal option provided guidance for an
Indiana appellate court in Peddycord v. Peddycord." The court
held that the formula based on the voluntary withdrawal of a
partner provided a more accurate assessment of value than did the
formula applied in the event of a partner's death.' The opinion
used an analogy based on a life insurance policy."3  Both the
judge had discretion to ignore these figures, the judge failed to incorporate any of the
probabilities in the explanation for his conclusions. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Janssen v. Janssen, 331 N.W.2d 752, 765 (Minn. 1983)). The court of
appeals believed either of the two alternatives would be satisfactory. Id. Thus, a valuation
based on evidence that one particular option would likely occur would be just. Id. at 312.
Alternatively, the payment based on the partnership interest could be distributed upon
receipt. Id. The court analogized the present situation with Janssen, 331 N.W.2d at 752,
which held that an unmatured pension could be divided at the time of marital dissolution but
paid when the pension benefits were received because of the difficulty in valuing the pension
benefits prior to vesting or maturity. Id.
109. 402 N.W.2d 111 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). The agreement governing the law
partnership provided formulas for three types of termination: death or permanent disability,
withdrawal prior to retirement and termination at retirement. Id. at 116. In the first
instance, the partnership interest was to be valued at a twelve-month share of the partner's
allocated income; while in the second the partner received a sixth-month share of its
allocated income. Id. In the last scenario, the partner received no additional compensation.
Id.
110. Id. at 117 (quoting Sefkow v. Sefkow, 372 N.W.2d 37,43 (Minn. Ct. App.), remanded
on other grounds, 374 N.W.2d 733 (Minn. 1985).
111. 479 N.E.2d 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). See also Weaver v. Weaver, 324 S.E.2d 915
(N.C. Ct. App. 1985); In re Marriage of Lewis 336 N.W.2d 171 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983); In re
Marriage of Wilson, 443 N.E.2d 31 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d
343 (Wis. 1981); Johnson v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 208 (Minn. 1979).
112. Peddycord, 479 N.E.2d at 616.
113. Id. The court believed that such an analogy was appropriate when considering the
payout provisions of each type of agreement. Id.
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partnership agreement and the life insurance policy yielded lower
payouts when the individual terminated the relationship at a time
of his or her own choosing."' The court deemed such values,
which, similar to divorce itself, are based on voluntary withdrawal,
more accurate because the decision was within the control of the
person."5
In contrast, the death benefit option in a partnership agree-
ment was used to calculate the value of a partnership interest in
Harmon v. Harmon.11 6  While neither option in the partnership
agreement, death or voluntary withdrawal of the partner, was likely
to occur,"7 the court found that the formula based on the death
of the partner represented the value closest to economic reality.'
While many courts select a particular contingency provision in
the partnership agreement for valuation purposes, other courts give
little, if any, credence to the partnership agreement. 9 Remem-
bering that the goal of valuation is accuracy, a court need not
restrict itself to using merely one or even any of the formulas as
provided by the partnership agreement. 1" Such a limitation
could be futile because agreements rarely contemplate valuation of
the partnership interest for purposes of equitable distribution. 2'
Alternatively, a court could permit valuation of the partnership
interest, but only when the professional spouse terminates the
relationship with the firm. 22 Thus, no award for the partnership
114. Id. at 617.
115. Id.
116. 578 N.Y.S.2d 897 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). See also Stem v. Stem, 331 A.2d 257 (N.J.
1975) (holding that the calculation of a partner's interest upon death is probably the most
accurate means of valuation).
117. Harmon, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 901-02. While the court conceded that the death benefit
valuation was a fiction because the partner could not receive it, the court believed that the
withdrawal option could also not be realized as the partner intended to continue with the
firm. Id.
118. Id. at 902. Specifically, the court found the voluntary withdrawal formula to be
inaccurate because it failed to include any interest in work in progress, uncollected accounts
or goodwill, interests which the court believed to be of economic value to the continuing
partner. Id.
119. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Morris, 588 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
120. In re Marriage of Morris, 588 S.W.2d at 43. The court held that the trial court was
in error for allowing the parties to successfully argue that the valuation was restricted to one
of the methods in the redemption agreement. Id. The court believed that a true
determination of value need not be limited only to formulas listed in the agreement. Id.
121. Id. at 44.
122. Flynn v. Flynn, 402 N.W.2d 111, 117 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). See Balogh v. Balogh,
356 N.W.2d 307, 312 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Janssen v. Janssen, 331 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn.
1983).
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interest would be available to the nonprofessional spouse at the
dissolution of the marriage; rather, both the spouse and the partner
would be required to wait for the happening of a contingency as
enumerated by the partnership agreement before any payout."
At that time, each party would recognize a portion of the financial
gain, if any, that is allowed by the agreement.1" Such an ap-
proach would delay the division of the partnership interest as
marital property; however, it would allow for an actual valuation
rather than an approximation that burdens the professional spouse
with the payment for a marital asset that, at the time of divorce, is
essentially not liquid.
C. Limitations on the Inclusion of Goodwill by the Partnership
Agreement
The value of goodwill possessed by a firm can be successfully
insulated from equitable distribution. Goodwill has been found in
large firms, but it is usually unrealizable and, therefore, unavailable
for equitable distribution.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico addressed a partnership
agreement that limited goodwill to $1 in all cases unless another
figure for goodwill was consistently shown on the corporation
books.1" The agreement had been followed by members of the
firm on over 150 occasions for buy-ins and buy-outs of partners.126
In each instance, goodwill was limited as per the agreement.27
The fact that goodwill was limited in all circumstances indicated
that the partnership agreement lacked an intent to frustrate any
community property principles.1" Accordingly, the court held
that the non-shareholder spouse should be held to the terms of the
partnership agreement as it affected the partner. 29 This prevent-
ed the non-shareholder spouse from realizing a value greater than
that which the shareholder spouse could have received under the
agreement.
130
123. Flynn, 402 N.W.2d at 117.
124. Id.
125. Hertz v. Hertz, 657 P.2d 1169 (N.M. 1983).




130. Hertz, 657 P.2d at 1174. The court noted the inequity of compelling a professional
practitioner to pay a spouse intangible assets that could not be realized by sale or liquidation.
Id.
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Similar reasoning was employed by the Court of Appeals of
Texas in Finn v. Finn."' The court found that "[w]ithout ques-
tion the goodwill of a long established firm has commercial
value."'32 Nevertheless, when it held that the goodwill of the
enterprise was not subject to equitable distribution the court found
certain factors decisive. First, the practice was conducted in the
names of two retired founding partners rather than the partners
currently senior in the firm.' Second, the professional spouse
had been working for the firm for only twenty-five of the nearly
one hundred years of the firm's existence) 34 Finally, a partner
could not receive a portion of the goodwill held by the firm under
any circumstances including death or voluntary withdrawal. 35
The New Mexico and Texas courts' limitations on the
equitable distribution of goodwill by the partnership agreement
were firmly based on factors also utilized by Pennsylvania courts in
other situations. Both courts emphasized the significance of the
fact that in no situation could the partners access the value of the
firms' goodwill. 36  Additionally, the McCabe court emphasized
the efforts of the partnership agreement to keep the goodwill with
the firm, indicating that the partners' intention to place the
prosperity of the firm above that of any individual member.
1 37
By enhancing the well-being of the business, each partner could
thereby benefit in the future though continued efforts on behalf of
the enterprise.
138
These considerations bear a striking similarity to those found
important by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in McCabe.
McCabe emphasized that the fortune of the firm could be a
legitimate goal that justified the limitations on the access of
partners to the assets of the enterprise. 139 Additionally, McCabe
found that the realizable value of the partnership interests was
important."4 Injustice could result when the spouse of a partner
131. 658 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
132. Id. at 741.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 741-42.
136. Hertz, 657 P.2d at 1174; Finn, 658 S.W.2d at 742. See McCabe v. McCabe, 575 A.2d
87, 89 (Pa. 1990).
137. McCabe, 575 A.2d at 89, 89-90 n.4.
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had greater access to the business assets than did the partner.141
The McCabe court also found decisive the fact that the value of a
partner's interest remained virtually unchanged regardless of the
reasons for departure from the firm.42 If a professional spouse's
interest remained unchanged regardless of whether she left the firm
voluntarily, by retirement, or because of death, then surely the
value of that interest would be the same for purposes of equitable
distribution.
Not all courts have allowed a restrictive partnership agreement
to control whether goodwill exists for purposes of property
distribution upon divorce. When deciding In re Brooks43 the
Court of Appeals of Washington found that the value of goodwill
could be distributed at divorce even though it could not be sold or
realized by the partner.'"M The important consideration was that
the goodwill had value to the professional spouse as a member of
the organization. 45 The Court of Appeals of Arizona reached
the same conclusion in Malloy v. Malloy."4  In this case, the
partnership agreement provided for different valuation formulas
depending upon the nature of the partner's withdrawal from the
firm. 47 Accordingly, the court deemed the agreement to be only
one factor for valuation purposes, and thus, emphasis was placed
on the value of the goodwill to the partner."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court briefly addressed the
relationship between a partnership agreement and goodwill in
141. Id.
142. McCabe, 575 A.2d at 89.
143. In re Marriage of Brooks, 756 P.2d 161 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (relying on In re
Marriage of Fleege, 588 P.2d 1136 (Wash. 1979)).
144. Id. at 163.
145. Id at 162-63. See also Mitchell v. Mitchell, 732 P.2d 208 (Ariz. 1987) (ruling that
a partnership agreement provided no value be placed on goodwill of firm even though the
agreement considered payments to partner in the event of death or retirement that were not
limited to tangible assets and accounts receivable, thus implying payment for goodwill); In
re Marriage of Slater, 160 Cal. Rptr. 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that a partnership
agreement was not binding because it did not contemplate situation of equitable distribution
upon divorce). But see Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. 1987) (explaining that under
certain circumstances value of goodwill may be established via buy-sell agreement); In re
Marriage of Ondrasek, 377 N.W.2d 190 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (concluding that the value of
a partner's interest for purposes of dissolution to be determined by monetary consequences
of partner's withdrawal from business).
146. 761 P.2d 138 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
147. Id. at 141.
148. Id. at 142.
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Butler.49 The court, having disregarded the partnership agree-
ment as a guide to valuation, had no reason to apply the agree-
ment's limitations as to goodwill." Consequently, the court held
that the nature of the goodwill in the business in question was to
be considered."' If the goodwill of the enterprise was attached
only to the professional spouse, similar to a sole proprietorship,
then the goodwill was not distributable.5 2  Conversely, any
goodwill possessed by the corporation itsel, divisible from the
efforts of the individual members, was distributable.53 The
supreme court adopted a view different from both lower courts
when it found that some, but not all, of the goodwill of the
corporation was distributable upon divorce.'-'
Again, the dichotomy in reasoning as evidenced by McCabe
and Butler is apparent. In Brooks and Malloy, as in Butler, the
value of the partnership interest to the individual partner is
important. Therefore, the agreement does not take priority, and
certain other factors again come into play. Specifically, the
partnership agreement does not provide a clear value of the
partner's interest because the value is subject to change depending
upon whether the partner leaves the firm voluntarily or through
some occurrence beyond the partner's control. The ability of the
professional spouse to realize gain from ownership of the corporate
asset, such as goodwill, is of no importance.
Thus, jurisdictions other than Pennsylvania offer some
guidance on the ability of a partnership agreement to limit value of
corporate goodwill as an asset subject to equitable distribution. In
an effort to effect equity between parties, the courts will apply the
restrictions and formulas set forth in partnership agreements only
in certain situations.
149. Butler v. Butler, 663 A.2d 148, 155-56 (Pa. 1995).
150. Id. at 156.
151. Id.
152. Id. See, e.g., Buckl v. Buckl, 542 A.2d 65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); DeMasi v. DeMasi,
530 A.2d 871 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Beasley v. Beasley, 518 A.2d 545 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
153. Butler, 663 A.2d at 155-56.
154. Id. at 156.
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VII. General Guidelines For Determining The Applicability Of
A Partnership Agreement To Valuing A Partner's Interest
For Equitable Distribution
A court will value a partnership interest with the paramount
goal of accuracy. Consideration will be given to the various assets
of a business enterprise including both physical and intangible
property. In most instances, a court will look first to the terms of
a partnership agreement for a formula to aid in the valuation of a
partner's interest. Based on precedent, Pennsylvania courts will
likely follow one of two approaches when reviewing the partnership
agreement. While initially a court may allow the agreement to
limit the value of the partner's interest to a figure which can be
realized upon departure from the firm, the court may later
disregard realization as a measure and focus on the value of the
interest to the partner as the sum available for equitable distri-
bution upon divorce.
The following facts and circumstances may indicate, based on
Pennsylvania precedent and persuasive authority of other jurisdic-
tions relying on similar rationales, that the partnership agreement
provides a valid formula for valuing a partner's interest in a
firm. 1 55 The agreement and the formulas it sets forth must have
a basis in the current value of the enterprise. Fixed or predeter-
mined values will be of no use to achieve this goal. Provided the
contingency options are based on the current assets and liabilities
of the business, then a contingency option designed specifically for
equitable distribution purposes will be controlling. Alternatively,
contingency options which yield the same value regardless of
whether the partner voluntarily withdraws, dies, or retires may
provide guidance as well. A consistent value in many situations
will allow a court to apply that value to equitable distribution. In
addition, despite changing situations, a constant formula will
indicate that the value of a partnership interest is realizable to only
a certain extent. Such a limitation on the ability of a partner to
access corporate assets may be enforced against the nonprofessional
spouse as well.
The partnership agreement will indicate the priority of the
needs of the firm over the desires of its members when the
agreement limits the ability of a partner to withdraw assets. Such
155. See supra Part VI.A-B.
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a consideration has been endorsed by the courts as a valid reason
for restricting the value of a partnership interest.
Provided the partnership agreement conforms to the above
criteria, it may limit the value of economic goodwill. Similar
reasoning dictates that goodwill can be retained to benefit the
enterprise as a whole. Goodwill that exists but is unrealizable for
the partner can be excluded from equitable distribution.
Alternatively, the considerations listed below may signify that
the partnership agreement does not provide an accurate means of
valuation.1 16 Partnership agreements that use formulas based on
outdated asset valuation will likely be disregarded. Agreements
which provide no clear value of a partner's interest will also be of
little use. Specifically, contingency options in the agreement that
change formulas depending upon whether the partner leaves
involuntarily or by choice indicate that the agreement is ambiguous
for purposes of equitable distribution. In such an instance, a court
may not recognize the limitations of what value can be realized by
a partner because the realizable value will change with the reason
for departure.
Further, such a partnership agreement will likely be ineffective
in limiting goodwill. The goodwill must first be established,
however, by examining the nature of the business and the efforts
of the partner in enhancing the reputation of the entity. If goodwill
is possessed by the firm, then it is likely to be distributable.
Goodwill attached to the professional spouse alone will not be
considered a marital asset, and thus, the terms of the partnership
agreement will be irrelevant.
VIII. Conclusion
Valuing a partnership interest for equitable distribution is a
difficult but manageable task. Keeping in mind the goal of justice
and fairness, as set forth by the Divorce Code, will aid in deter-
mining an accurate assessment of the worth of the partnership
interest. Since the issues in equitable distribution are fact specific,
precedent can provide guidance only in the form of general
considerations for valuation. Accordingly, both the business
156. See supra Part VI.A-B.
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enterprise and the governing partnership agreement must be
analyzed to find an accurate valuation of a partner's interest for
equitable distribution of marital assets upon divorce.
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